man, H. Rowan Gaither, a lawyer and the chairman of the Ford Foundation until 1956. The report condemned the American deterrent as totally inadequate. It contended that the Soviet Union was catching up militarily and economically with the United States much faster than Washington had anticipated." The Eisenhower administration was embarrassed by leaks to the press in December of some passages from the report. In January, the RockefeIler Brothers Fund released areport on 'Prospect for America' , a study undertaken by the RockefeIler Panel, on which Henry Kissinger served as director and Nelson RockefeIler as chairman. As in the Gaither report, the so-called 'Rockefeller report' viewed the current state of US national security with great concern, claiming that 'our retaliatory power ... is imperilled by Soviet advances in the missile field'. 7 These reports further fuelled Congressional criticisms of Eisenhower's New Look. The Sputnik inaugurated the so-called 'missile gap' controversy, which dominated the debate about US national security policy for the remainder of Eisenhower' s second term.
The president seemed more surprised by the 'intensity of the public concern' about the supposed Soviet superiority in science and technology than he was about the success of Sputnik itself." The main source of his indifference to the Soviet technological threat came from the U-2 photographs. Although U-2 did not have sufficient range to cover the entire Soviet Union, the photographs whieh the aireraft did take suggested that the Soviet Union was not pursuing a consistent programme of ICBM testing. In fact not until March 1959 did the Russians resume such tests in earnest. In a letter to Andrew Goodpaster, the staff secretary to the president, on 9 October 1958, Allen Dulles reported that:
We have not ruled out the possibility that the Soviets may establish in the latter part of 1958 a limited operational eapability with comparatively unproven ICBMs .... But following the first few ICBMs and earth satellite launchings, the test-firing program apparently proceeded at a slower pace than we had antieipated. More recently, ... there has been no successful firing of the ICBM test vehicle since late May 1958, a period ofmore than five months.?
Eisenhower was eonvinced by the photographie evidence that the alleged 'rnissile gap' had no foundation whatsoever, but he refused to divulge to the public any information that might reveal that U-2s were flying over Soviet air spaee, despite pressure from the Dulles brothers to do so. 10 His confidence was also enhaneed by evidence produced by his scientific advisers of Soviet backwardness in many aspeets of missile technology, despite highly publicised Russian achievement in October 1957.
